W
ith 434 participating organizations, the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) represents the signature payment reform of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the largest new payment model implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and the leading reason that the Department of Health and Human Services' ambitious goal of tying 50% of fee-for-service Medicare payments to such models by 2018 remains possible. For each accountable care organization (ACO) in the MSSP, the program sets a benchmark for total spending in an attributed patient population and provides incentives to reduce spending below the benchmark while providing highquality care (Figure) . Whether the MSSP will substantially reduce spending has been hotly debated and may very well shape the future of Medicare payment policy-and thus the opportunities for clinicians to be rewarded for high-value care.
For the first 220 ACOs entering the MSSP in 2012 or 2013, actuarial calculations by CMS and an independent evaluation through 2013 indicated modest early spending reductions that were entirely offset by bonus payments to ACOs (1). These offsetting payments occurred in no small part because Track 1 of the MSSPthe track chosen by 95% of current participantsrequires no downside risk for spending in excess of benchmarks ( Figure) . Thus, Medicare pays sharedsavings bonuses to many ACOs without recouping any portion of spending above ACO benchmarks. If spending fluctuated randomly, Medicare would incur losses from the program.
The lack of a net reduction in total Medicare spending was a major reason why Track 1 of the MSSP was not considered an advanced Alternative Payment Model (APM) by the recently proposed regulations for implementing the Medicare Affordability and CHIP [Children's Health Insurance Program] Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015 (2) . This act established a new status quo in fee-for-service Medicare (the Merit-based Incentive Payment System) that will adjust Part B payments to clinicians starting in 2019 based on a set of performance measures. Clinicians in advanced APMs are exempt from the otherwise mandatory Merit-based Incentive Payment System and will receive lump-sum bonuses equal to 5% of their Part B reimbursements annually from 2019 through 2024, followed by higher fee updates thereafter (Figure) . Under the proposed MACRA regulations, ACO models are considered advanced APMs only if they involve downside risk (as in MSSP Tracks 2 and 3).
Expectations of instant savings from the MSSP, however, were unrealistic. That ACOs reduced spending at all within 1 to 2 years signified a promising behavioral response that established the prospect for increased savings as ACOs redesign their care systems and learn which cost-cutting strategies are most effective. Indeed, more recent estimates indicate that spending reductions by ACOs in the MSSP roughly doubled from 0.8% in 2013 to 1.5% in 2014, exceeding bonus payments in 2014 and constituting a net savings to Medicare of $287 million (3) .
Although these savings amount to just 0.7% of total spending for beneficiaries in the MSSP, actual savings to Medicare are grossly underestimated by both CMS and formal evaluations, because spending reductions by ACOs indirectly affect Medicare spending. First, provider responses to ACO contracts probably also affect care of patients that are served by ACOs but not attributed to these organizations under the contracts. Conservatively assuming that a $1.00 reduction among attributed patients leads to a $0.20 reduction among nonattributed patients and that at least half of ACOs' Medicare revenue is devoted to nonattributed patients (4), such spillovers would have added upward of $126 million in savings to Medicare in 2014 (3).
Second, ACO spending reductions-regardless of offsetting bonuses-reduce ACO benchmarks because they lower the spending growth rates used to update benchmarks each year. Consequently, CMS's comparisons of ACO spending with benchmarks underestimate actual savings. The extent of underestimation will only grow as the MSSP expands and as regional spending trends replace national trends in benchmark updates (a recent change by CMS) (5).
Third, spending reductions by ACOs similarly lower Medicare Advantage spending because payments to Medicare Advantage plans are tied directly to local fee-for-service spending (as fee-for-service spending declines, so do Medicare Advantage payments). With 1 in 4 fee-for-service beneficiaries currently in ACOs, for example, a 0.7% net spending reduction in the MSSP (as occurred in 2014) would be expected to reduce Medicare Advantage spending by roughly $272 million (6) .
Thus, Medicare's actual net savings attributable to the MSSP in 2014 were closer to $685 million, or 1.6% of spending for ACO patients. Although still modest, these early savings could be considered surprisingly large because MSSP incentives for ACOs to reduce spending have been very weak. Not only have sharedsavings rates been low (≤50%), the original MSSP rules imposed subsequently lowered benchmarks on ACOs that lowered spending, thereby undercutting incentives to reduce spending further (7) .
Recognition of the full and growing savings produced by the MSSP underscores the importance of encouraging program participation and calls for close scrutiny of the proposed exclusion of Track 1 from the This article was published at www.annals.org on 11 October 2016.
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definition of advanced APMs. The key policy decision before CMS is whether to use the 5% bonus under MACRA to encourage participation in ACO models broadly or only in models with downside risk. A strong argument could be made in favor of broader use of this participation incentive.
Because the 5% bonus is applied only to Part B payments for professional services, even modest savings would keep the cost of the bonus for Track 1 ACOs below the fee-for-service status quo. Moreover, growing savings among MSSP participants could increase further, particularly if incentives to save are strengthened (1, 3, 8) , and expanding the MSSP would accelerate indirect savings as long as expansion attracts more organizations that lower spending. In addition, all MSSP ACOs must eventually assume downside risk to stay in the program, and higher shared-savings rates could be used to encourage earlier entry into tracks with downside risk. Even if ACOs kept 100% of spending reductions below benchmark when bearing downside risk, Medicare would still save because the benchmarks are reduced when ACOs reduce spending; indeed, savings may even increase because higher shared-savings rates strengthen the ACOs' incentives to save.
Finally, the 5% bonus may be particularly important to encourage participation by physician groups that are not integrated with large systems or hospitals and thus lack the capital to invest in care infrastructure and financial reserves to cover potential losses from downside risk (9, 10).
Redefining advanced APMs to include all MSSP tracks has become particularly important to the program's viability in the wake of CMS's recent decision to converge benchmarks for ACOs in the same region toward a common regional average (5, 8). Under original MSSP rules, benchmarks were based on ACOs' historical spending levels so that they would receive bonuses for improvement regardless of the starting point. Under the revised rules, organizations with spending levels well above a regional average (and thus little hope for shared savings as benchmarks converge toward the average) will be less motivated to enter or continue in the program or to invest in strategies to lower spending. Thus, providing the 5% bonus to Track 1 ACOs would mitigate the risks of discouraging participation by highspending organizations, which have thus far generated the bulk of the savings (1, 3) .
The CMS is under intense pressure to demonstrate savings from new payment models now. However, any expectation beyond modest initial progress has been impossible to meet. Health care system reform is slow and incremental. Great strides are possible over a decade or two but require tradeoffs between short-term gains and long-term success. The implementation of recent legislation to encourage participation in new payment models presents such a tradeoff and an opportunity to build on a promising start to the ACO programs. It is time to acknowledge the early progress and allow policymakers to cast their gaze to the future. 
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